In this paper, we estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship between money balance as a ratio of income and the Treasury bill rate for the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01, and, in turn, use the relationship to obtain welfare cost estimates of in ‡ation. Using the Johansen (1991, 1995) technique, we estimate a log-log speci…cation and a semi-log model of the above relationship. Based on the …ts of the speci…cations, we decided to rely more on the welfare cost measure obtained under the log-log money demand model. Our estimates suggest that the welfare cost of in ‡ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent and 0.67 percent of GDP, for a band of 3 to 6 percent of in ‡ation. Thus, it seems that the SARB's current in ‡ation target band of 3-6 percent provides quite a good approximation in terms of welfare.
Introduction
Studies on welfare cost of in ‡ation have been the focus of extensive theoretical and empirical analyses in both the recent and more distant past. Using Bailey's (1956) consumer surplus approach, as well as, the compensating variation approach, Lucas (2000) provided estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation for the US economy based on annual data for the period of 1900 to 1994. Lucas '(2000) calculations, based on the log-log money demand speci…cation, indicated that reducing the interest rate from 3% to zero would yield a bene…t equivalent to an increase in real output of about 0.009(or 0.9 percent). Serletis et al. (2004) , in their study dealing with the welfare cost of in ‡ation for Canada and the United States, however, came up with much smaller …gures, compared to Lucas (2000) , when they used recent advances in the …eld of applied econometrics to estimate the interest elasticity of money demand. Unlike Lucas (2000) , Ireland (2007) , however, showed that a semi-log money demand speci…cation …ts the post 1980 US data better than a log-log econometric model. Based on the estimation of the semi-log money demand model, Ireland (2007) found that a 10 percent rate of in ‡ation when compared to price stability would imply a welfare cost of 0.21 percent of income. This …gure, though lower than that of Lucas (2000) and Serletis et al. (2004) , was in line with Fisher's (1981) …ndings of 0.30 percent and a value of 0.45 percent obtained earlier by Lucas (1981) .
Department of Economics, University of Pretoria y Department of Economics, University of Pretoria 1 Given that welfare cost estimates di¤er remarkably based on alternative money demand functions, we in this study aim to …rst derive a money demand function that appropriately de…nes the South African money market, and then, in turn, use it to obtain welfare cost estimates of in ‡ation. For this purpose, we look at quarterly data over the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01, and given the econometric problems of non-stationary data, use the Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 cointegration technique to obtain a long-run money demand relationship. Note measures of welfare cost of in ‡ation, are important for any economy, but more so in a country like South Africa, where the central bank targets in ‡ation. 1 To put it di¤erently, we try and investigate how substantial are the welfare costs of in ‡ation under the current in ‡ation target zone of 3 to 6 percent pursued by the South African Reserve Bank 2 , and if there is a need to rethink the band of the target in terms of the welfare cost of in ‡ation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst attempt to measure the welfare cost of in ‡ation for the South African economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief summary of the theoretical issues regarding the estimation of the welfare cost of in ‡ation, while, Section 3 and 4, respectively, discusses the data and presents the estimation of the log-log and the semi-log money demand speci…cations. Section 4 also calculates the welfare cost estimates for the South African economy. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Theoretical Foundations
As indicated by Lucas (2000) , money demand speci…cation is vital in determining the appropriate size of the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Lucas (2000) contrasts between two competing speci…cations for money demand. One, inspired by Meltzer (1963) , relates the natural logarithm ofm; a ratio of money balances to nominal income, and the natural logarithm of a short-term nominal interest rate r. Formally, this can be expressed as follows:
where A>0 is a constant and >0 measures the absolute value of the interest elasticity of money demand. Another speci…cation, adapted from Cagan (1956) , links the log of m to the level of r via the following equation:
where B>0 is a constant and >0 measures the absolute value of the semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the interest rate. By applying the methods outlined in Bailey (1956) , Lucas (2000) transformed the evidence on money demand into a welfare cost estimate. Note Bailey (1956) described the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the area under the inverse money demand function, or the "consumers's surplus", that could be gained by reducing the interest rate to zero from an existing (average or steady-state) value. So if m(r)is the estimated function, and (m)is the inverse function, then the welfare cost can be de…ned as:
As seen from Equation 3, obtaining a measure for the welfare cost amounts to, integrating under the money demand curve as the interest rate rises from zero to a positive value to obtain the lost consumer surplus and then deducting the associated seigniorage revenue rm to deduce the deadweight loss. Since the function m has the dimensions of a ratio to income, so does the function w. The value of w(r); represents the fraction of income that people needs, as compensation, in order to be indi¤erent between living in a steady-state with an interest rate constant at r or an identical steady state with an interest of close or equal to zero. Given this, Lucas (2000) shows that when the money demand function is given by (E1) or is m(r) = Ar , the welfare cost of in ‡ation as a percentage of GDP is obtained as follows:
While, for a semi-log money demand speci…cation i.e., m(r) = Be r , w(r)is obtained by the following formula:
As can be seen from (Equations 4) and (Equations 5), an estimate of the interest elasticity of money demand is crucial in evaluating the welfare cost of in ‡ation, and, hence, we …rst need to obtain the long-run relationship between the ratio of money balance to income and a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money, captured by a short-term nominal interest rate.
Data
In this study, we use quarterly time series data from the second quarter The variables used in this study are the money balances ratio (rm3), generated by dividing the broad measure of money supply (M3) 3 by the nominal income (nominal GDP), and short term interest rate, in our case proxied by the 91 days Treasury bill rate (tbr). 4 All series, except for the Treasury bill rate are seasonally adjusted. Further, for the estimation of the log-log speci…cation both the ratio of money balances and the Treasury bill rate are transformed into their logarithmic values, and are denoted by lrm3 and ltbr, respectively.
Empirical Results
As is standard in time series analysis, we start o¤ by studying the univariate characteristics of the data. In this regard, we performed tests of stationarity on our variables (lrm3, ltbr and tbr ) using the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the Dickey-Fuller test with GLS Detrending (DF-GLS), the Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. As can be seen from Table 1 , the variables were found to follow an autoregressive process with a unit root, as the null hypothesis of a unit root could not be rejected for the variables, expressed in levels for the ADF, the DF-GLS and the PP tests, while for the KPSS test, the null of stationarity was rejected. As the variables were found to be non-stationary, it paved the way for the Johansen test for cointegration between lrm3 and ltbr in (1) and lrm3 and tbr in (2) .
At this juncture it is important to point out a possible concern in the analysis. These statistical tests which …rst analyzes the stationarity and then checks for cointegration between lrm3 and ltbr in (1) and lrm3 and tbr in (2), requires, as Ireland (2007) puts it, a "somewhat schizophrenic view of those data"since, in a linear framework, the analysis of the log-log model requires ltbr to follow an autoregressive process with a unit root, while the identical analysis of the semi-log model requires tbr to be I(1). Bae (2005) actually provides a detailed discussion of the case in which both the models can be estimated under the common assumption that tbr follows an autoregressive unit root process, with the log-log speci…cation being viewed as a non-linear relationship between lrm3 and tbr and the semi-log model viewed as a linear framework for the same two variables. As in Ireland (2007), we follow Anderson and Rasche (2001), by treating both as linear functions linking lrm3 and ltbr in (Equations 1) and lrm3 and tbr in (Equations 2) and, thus, putting the two models on "equal footing ex ante".
But, before we tested for cointegration, a test for the stability of the VAR model, including a constant as an exogonous variable was performed. Given that no roots were found to lie outside the unit circle for the estimated VAR based on 4 lags under both the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations, we conclude that the VARs are stable and suitable for further analysis. 5 Note the choice of 4 lags was based on the unanimity of two alternative lag-length criteria, namely the Schwarz information criterion and the Hannan-Quinn Information criterion for the log-log money demand speci…cation, and the Sequential Modi…ed LR test statistic for the semi-log money demand model. Before we proceed further, it is important to point out that though four criteria, namely the Final Prediction Error, the Akaike Information, the Schwarz Information and the HannanQuinn Information, overwhelmingly suggested the choice of two lags for the semi-log speci…cation, no cointegration could be detected using the Johansen test with two lags. However, as has been reported below, the cointegration test based on 4 lags, suggested by the Sequential Modi…ed LR test statistic, picked up one cointegrating relationship.
Once the issues of stability and the optimal lag length were settled, we tested for the cointegrating relationship based on the Johansen (1991, 1995) approach. For this purpose, we included four lags in the VAR, and allowed the level data to have linear trends, but the cointegrating equations to have only intercepts. Based on the Pantula Principle, both the Trace and the Maximum Eigen Value tests, showed that there is one stationary relationship in the data (r = 1) at 5 percent level of signi…cance for both the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations. The results have been reported in Tables 2 and 3.   6 Given one cointegrating relationship (r = 1);the Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 procedure gives the maximum likelihood estimates of the unrestricted cointegrating relation 0 X t :Even if the unrestricted is uniquely determined, depending on the chosen normalization, is not necessarily meaningful from an economic point of view. Therefore, an important part of long-run cointegration analysis is to impose (over-) identifying restrictions on to achieve economic interpretability (Hendry et al.  2000) .
As we are more interested in the relationship between the money balance ratio and interest rate, for both speci…cations, lrm3 was restricted to unity. Given that we have only one cointegrating vector, the normalizing restriction on lrm3 is enough to exactly identify the long-run relationship. However, we encountered two serious econometric problems with this restriction. First, the restriction was not binding. Secondly, the adjustment coe¢ cient of lrm3 was insigni…cant under both the speci…cations. Imposing an additional zero restriction on the adjustment coe¢ cient of lrm3 did ensure binding restrictions, but at the cost of suggesting that the ratio of real balance to income was in fact exogenous and we should not be normalizing on lrm3. Given this, we decided to normalize on the interest rate variable, i.e., ltbr for the log-log speci…cation and tbr for the semi-log speci…cation. Further, with the adjustment coe¢ cients on lrm3 still being insigni…cant in both the models, we restricted them to zero, and obtained binding restrictions. 7 Note with lrm3 now treated as the right-hand side variable, weak exogeneity of the same is what should be expected. The adjustment coe¢ cients of ltbr and tbr were negative and signi…cant, with them correcting for 6.9 percent and 8.08 percent of the disequilibrium in the next period, respectively. Based on the above restrictions, the obtained long-run relationship for the log-log speci…cation is as follows: Figures 1 and 2 depict the cointegrating relationships under the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations respectively. As can be seen, the residuals of the two cointegrating equations are meanreverting around zero and are stationary, which implies that the estimated cointegrating relations are appropriate. 8 Note what we have in equations (6) and (7) are actually the inverse of the money demand functions, with rate of interest as the dependant variable. Alternatively, we can view equations (6) and (7) as long-run rules for the treasury bill rate. Whatever we choose to call these equations is not important to our cause, but it is the values of the coe¢ cients of these two estimated cointegrating relationships, that are more relevant. The obtained interest elasticity, in absolute term, equals to 0.2088 and the interest semi elasticity is equal to 2.1991, both of which the test have been suppressed to save space. They are, however, available upon request.
are obtained by taking the reciprocal of the coe¢ cients corresponding to lrm3 in equations (6) and (7) respectively. Importantly, the signs of the interest rate elasticity and semi-elasticity, in both the speci…cations, adhere to economic theory. Based on these two, elasticities, we are now ready to calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation as outlined in Lucas (2000), and described above in equations (E4) and (E5).
The estimates of the intercept and slope coe¢ cient reported under the log-log speci…cation imply values of A = 0.3323 and that of = 0.2088, while for the semi-log speci…cation the values of B = 0.6862 and that of = 2.1991. 9 Plugging these values into the corresponding formula for the welfare cost measures, given by equations (E4) and (E5) respectively, and using the fact that the average real rate of interest 10 over this period was equal to 7.70 percent, so that a zero rate of in ‡ation would also imply a nominal rate of interest equal to 7.70 percent"we obtain the baseline value of w under price stability. Naturally then, a value of r = 10.70 corresponds to a three percent rate of in ‡ation, while, when r = 13.70, the economy experiences a six percent in ‡ation, and so on. So the welfare costs of in ‡ation are evaluated by subtracting the value of w at an in ‡ation equal to zero from the value of the same at a positive rate of in ‡ation.
Given above in Table 4 are the measures of the welfare costs of in ‡ation, under the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations for the in ‡ation rates of 3, 6, 10 and 15 percent, respectively. For an in ‡ation rate of 3 percent, the cost of in ‡ation under both the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations are 0.34 percent of GDP. However, as the in ‡ation rate increase from 6 percent to 15 percent, the cost of in ‡ation in the log-log model ranges between 0.67 percent of GDP and 1.56 percent of GDP, while for the semi-log money demand function the welfare cost varies between 0.76 percent of GDP and 2.41 percent of GDP.
11 So, the two speci…cations provide clearly di¤erent measures of the cost of in ‡ation with the semi-log function imposing greater welfare loss on the economy as the in ‡ation rate increases beyond the 3 percent mark.
So the pertinent question now is: Which one of the two inverse money demand speci…cations represents the money market of South Africa better? To resolve this issue we look at couple aspects of the two alternative money demand models: First, we compare simple linear and exponential plots of the relationship between tbr and lrm3 with the scatter plot of these two variables, and; second, we look at the R 2 and Adjusted R 2 values of these two …ts of the data. 12 In sum, we basically analyze the goodness of …t for the two speci…cations. As can be seen from Figure 3 , it is impossible to choose between the two models based on the linear and the exponential plots of the data. However, with the R 2 and the Adjusted R 2 values of the inverse money demand relationship captured by the log-log speci…cation being higher than the corresponding values of the semi-log model, 13 we decided to rely more on the results from the former. In addition, recall that although there existed overwhelming evidence that suggested the choice of two lags for the semi-log (2007), we de…ne the real rate of return to be equal to the di¤erence between the nominal interest rate and the in ‡ation rate, where the in ‡ation rate is obtained as the percentage change in the seasonally adjusted series of the CPI. In addition, the real rate of interest was found to be stationary based on the ADF, the DF-GLS, the KPSS and the PP tests of unit roots. 1 1 Note that these obtained values for the welfare cost of in ‡ation are comparatively higher than those reported in Fischer (1981), Lucas (1981) , Lucas (2000) and Ireland (2007) for the US economy. 1 2 Note given that the plots are based on tbr and ltbr, the linear trend …tted to the data gives us the semi-log inverse money demand relationship, while, the exponential trend when taken logs will yield the log-log inverse money demand model. 1 3 The R 2 and the Adjusted R 2 values of the log-log model are 0.1517 and 0.1466 respectively, while those of the semi-log function are 0.1443 and 0.1391 respectively. speci…cation, no cointegration could be detected using the Johansen test with two lags. We, thus, had to use 4 lags, based on the Sequential Modi…ed LR test statistic, to obtain a stable long-run money demand relationship. Based on this, one can, perhaps, argue that the semi-log speci…cation is relatively less reliable, in comparison to the log-log model, as to depicting a true picture of the South African inverse money demand, over the period in concern. Alternatively, the bottom line of all this discussion is that, we tend to believe, that the welfare cost measures obtained from the log-log inverse money demand relationship is more appropriate. This implies that the welfare cost of in ‡ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent and 0.67 percent of GDP, for a band of 3 to 6 percent of in ‡ation.
Conclusion
This paper uses the Johansen (1991 Johansen ( , 1995 cointegration technique to …rst obtain an appropriate long-run money demand relationship for the South African economy and then, in turn, deduce welfare cost estimates based on the inverse money demand function, as outlined in Lucas (2000) . For this purpose, we look at quarterly data over the period of 1965:02 to 2007:01 and estimate a log-log function and a semi-log speci…cation. Based on the …ts of the speci…cations, we decided to rely more on the welfare cost measure obtained under the log-log inverse money demand model. Our estimates suggest that the welfare cost of in ‡ation for South Africa ranges between 0.34 percent and 0.67 percent of GDP, for a band of 3 to 6 percent of in ‡ation. Though, these measures are way higher when compared to the estimates observed in the literature, they are reasonably low. Based on our estimates, we can conclude that the SARB's current in ‡ation target band of 3-6 percent provides quite a good approximation in terms of welfare, at least in comparison to a Friedman-type de ‡ationary rule of zero nominal rate of interest.
However, it is important to point that our welfare cost estimates merely measures the distortion in the money demand due to positive nominal interest rates. But as argued by Dotsey and Ireland (1996) , in a general equilibrium framework, rise in the in ‡ation rates can distort other marginal decisions and, hence, can negatively impact both the level and the growth rate of aggregate output. In addition, as pointed out by Feldstein (1997) , interactions between in ‡ation and a non-indexed tax code can add immensely to the welfare cost of in ‡ation. Given these two additional sources of in ‡ation costs, there is no denying the fact that one can achieve, possibly, larger gains by reducing the in ‡ation target below 3 percent, the lower limit of the in ‡ation target band. 
